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850 IN BE HERNANDEZ· . [64·C.2d 
[Crim. No. 9823. In Bank. July 13, 1966.] 
In re ARTHUR A. HERNANDEZ on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] 
[2] 
[3] 
Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Right to Fair Trial: Judg-
ment - Sentence - Where One Count Is Defective. - Though 
defendant's prior conviction, which he denied, had not properly 
been proved and his judgment of conviction was modified to 
strike it, he was not denied due process of law and was not 
entitled to relief from the judgment as modified where he had 
waived a jury trial and was tried before a judge who could 
presumably weigh the evidence without being prejudiced by 
the charge of a prior conviction. 
Id.-Probation-Persons Eligible.-Although the fact that de-
fendant's accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon at the 
time of their robbery. made defendant guilty of first degree 
robbery (Pen. Code, § 211a) , he was eligible for probation 
where he was not himself so armed (Pen. Code, § 1203). 
Habeas Corpus - Grounds for Relief - Probation. - Habeas 
corpus is a proper remedy to secure reconsideration of an 
application for probation on a corrected record where the trial 
court may have been influenced in denying probation by ·an 
erroneous finding of a prior felony conviction. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Writ granted 'with directions. 
Arthur A. Hernandez, in pro. per., and Burton Marks, 
under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Robert R. Granucci 
and John T. Murphy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Re-
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner was convicted of first degree 
robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 211a) in a nonjury trial on an 
information charging him with a prior felony conviction in 
Arizona. He denied the prior conviction, and evidence of it 
was admitted at the trial. (Pen. Code, § 1025.1 ) The trial 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 42; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus 
(1st ed § 66). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, §§ 104, 1017; [2] 
Criminal Law, § 987; [3] Habeas Corpus, § 35. 
l"When a defendant who is charged ill the accusatory pleading with 
having suffered a previous conviction pleads either guilty or not guilty 
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court found that petitioner was guilty of robbery, that the 
offense was robbery in the first degree because an accomplice 
was armed with a deadly weapon, and that petitioner had 
suffered the prior felony conviction. 'It denied probation and 
sentenced petitioner to prison: On appeal the Attorney 
General conceded that the prior conviction had not been 
proved, because it could not bc determined from the Arizona 
records that the offense would have been a felony if committed 
in California. (See Pen. Code, § 1203.) The District Court of 
Appeal affirmed the conviction but modified the judgment to 
strike the prior conviction. (People v. Hernandez, nonpub-
lished opinion, District Court of Appeal, 2 Crim. 9864, July 7, 
1965.) We denied a petition for hearing. 
In this habeas corpus proceeding petitioner contends that 
he was denied due process of law by reason of the admis-
sion of evidence of his prior conviction and that the District 
Court of Appeal should have reversed the judgment and 
remanded the case for resentencing when it found .that the 
prior conviction had not been proved. 
[1] There is no merit in petitioner's contention that he was 
denied due process of law. Even if a jury might be unable 
nnder some circumstances to disregard a defendant's prior 
convictions in determining his guilt or innocence of the crime 
charged (see Lane V. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary (4th 
Cir.) 320 F.2d 179; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 [84 8.Ct. 
1774,12 L.Ed.2d 908, 1 A.L.R.3d 1205]), the facts of this case 
preclude the granting of relief. Petitioner waived a jury trial 
and was tried before a judge, who was presumably able to 
weigh the evidence without being prejudiced by a charge of a 
prior felony conviction. (See People v. Purvis, 52 Ca1.2d 871, 
883 [346 P.2d 22] ; People v. Powell, 34 Ca1.2d 196, 204-205 
[208 P.2d 974] ; People v. Smylie, 217 Cal.App.2d 118, 122 [31 
Cal.Rptr.360].) 
of the offense chlW'ged against him, he must be asked whether he has 
suffered Buch previous conviction. If he answers that he has, his answer 
must be entered in the minutes of the court, and must, unless withdrawn 
by consent of the court, be conclusive of the fact of his having suffered 
Buch previous conviction in all subsequent proceedings. If he answers that 
he has not, his answer must be entered in the minutes of the court, and 
the question whether or not he has suffered such previous conviction must 
be tried by the jury which tries the issue upon the plea of not guilty, 
or in case of a plea of guilty, by a jury impaneled for that purpose, or 
by the court if a jury is waived. The refusal of the defendant to answer 
is equivalent to a denial that he has suffered such previous conviction. 
In case the defendant pleads not guilty, and answers that he has Buffered 
the previous conviction, the charge of the previous conviction must not 
be read to the jury, nor alluded to on the triaL" 
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[2] Petitioner's second contention, however, is well taken. 
The third paragraph of section 1203 of the Penal Code provides 
that, "except in unusual cases where the interest of justice 
demands a departure from the declared policy, no judge shall 
grant probation to any person who shall have been convicted 
of robbery, burglary or arson, and who at the time of the 
perpetration of said crime or any of them or at the time of his 
arrest was himself armed with a deadly weapon (unless at the 
time he had a lawful right to carry the same), ... nor to any 
such person unless the court shall be satisfied that he has never 
been previously convicted of a felony in this state nor previ-
ously convicted in any other place of a public offense which 
would have been a felony if committed in this state." (Italics 
added.) Although the fact that petitioner's accomplice was 
armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the robbery made 
petitioner guilty of first degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211a), 
it did not affect"his eligibility for probation since he was not 
"bimself" so armed. (People v. Perkins, 37 Ca1.2d 62, 64 [230 
P.2d 353].) [3] The finding of the prior felony convic-
tion, however, brought petitioner withi* the limitation on the 
granting of probation set forth in section 1203 and might have 
influenced the trial court to deny his application for proba-
tion. If a trial court might have been influenced in deny-
ing probation by an erroneous finding of a prior felony 
conviction, habeas corpus is a proper remedy to secure recon-
sideration of the application for probation upon a corrected 
record. (In re Bartges, 44 Cal.2d 241, 247 [282 P.2d 47] ; see 
People v. Morton, 41 Cal.2d 536, 545 [261 P.2d 523].) . 
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is granted, and the 
District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Div. 
Three, is directed to recall its remittitur in People v. Hernan-
dez, 2 Crim. 9864, to vacate its decision, and to reverse the 
judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County for 
the sole purpose of permitting the trial judge to determine 
whether probation should be granted upon the corrected 
record. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and 
Burke, J., concurred. 
